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ABSTRACT
The truth-functional hypothesis states that indicative conditional sentences and the mate-
rial implication have the same truth conditions. Haze (2011) has rejected this hypothesis. 
He claims that a self-referential conditional, coupled with a plausible assumption about its 
truth-values and the assumption that the truth-functional hypothesis is true, lead to a liar’s 
paradox. Given that neither the self-referential conditional nor the assumption about its 
truth-values are problematic, the culprit of the paradox must be the truth-functional hypoth-
esis. Therefore, we should reject it. In this paper I argue that, contrary to what Haze thinks, 
the truth-functional hypothesis is not to blame. In fact, no liar’s paradox emerges when the 
truth-functional hypothesis is true; it emerges only if it is false. 
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The truth-functional hypothesis states that indicative conditional sentences and the mate-
rial implication have the same truth conditions. Haze (2011) has rejected this hypothesis on the 
basis that it gives rise to a liar’s paradox. In this short paper, I argue that, contrary to what Haze 
claims, no liar’s paradox emerges from the truth-functional hypothesis. I reconstruct Haze’s rea-
soning in the first section and argue against it in the second. 
The material implication and the liar’s paradox
Haze (2011) parts from the following self-referential conditional: 
If (1) is true, (1) is false.
Call the antecedent of (1) “A”, and its consequent “C”. Haze thinks it is plausible to assume 
that (1) is neither true nor false. He then argues that the following supposition is intuitively true: 
(S) Under the assumption that (1) is neither true nor false, A and C are both false.
(S) is based on the following intuitive reasoning: A states that (1) is true, and C states that
(1) is false. Both are inconsistent with the assumption that (1) is neither true nor false. Thus, if
the assumption is correct, A and C must be false.
Now, the problem is that if the truth-functional hypothesis—hereafter “TFH”—is correct, 
the reasoning above cannot hold. If TFH is correct and A and C are both false, then (1) must 
be true, since any material implication is true when both antecedent and consequent are false. 
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However, if (1) is true, A must be true, since it states that 
(1) is true, and C must be false, since it states that (1) is false.
But under TFH, (1) must be false, for it has a true antecedent 
and a false consequent. Nevertheless, if (1) is false, A must be
false, since it states that (1) is true. But in this case, (1) must
have a false antecedent and a true consequent, and therefore
it must be true according to the truth-functional hypothesis.
However, if (1) is true….
Thus, according to Haze, if we accept the reasoning sup-
porting (S) together with TFH, we must conclude that (1) 
generates a liar’s paradox. Both (S) and the reason that sup-
ports it seem to be correct and do not, by themselves, com-
mit us to the liar’s paradox, since we could have discarded 
(1) as neither true nor false, and still accept that A and C
had truth-values. Everything suggests that TFH is the culprit. 
Thus we must, Haze concludes, discard it.
Down (and out of) the 
Liar’s hole
A well-known feature of the material implication is that 
when the antecedent and the consequent of a conditional have 
truth-values, the conditional has truth-values: if the antecedent 
is true and the consequent is false, the conditional is false. The 
material implication is true in all remaining combinations of 
truth-values. According to TFH, these features of the material 
implication extend to indicative conditionals in general.
Here is a problem with Haze’s argument: his argument 
only works under the assumption that TFH is false. Given the 
acceptance of TFH, (1) has the same truth conditions as the 
material implication. However, as its truth table attests, mate-
rial implications are functions that always have truth-values. 
Thus, if (1) does not have truth-values, it cannot be a material 
implication by definition.
A reductio helps to support the argument above. From the
assumption that (1) is a material implication, it follows that (1) 
is not a material implication: If C is true, then (1) is false, but 
since (1) is a material implication, it can only be false when A 
is true and C is false. However, we have already assumed that C 
is true. Therefore, (1) cannot be false. On the other hand, if A 
is true, then (1) is true. But in this case, A is true and C is false, 
and (1) cannot be true when A is true and C is false. Thus, (1) 
cannot be true either. Therefore, (1) can neither be true nor 
false. Thus, (1) is not a material implication.
Yet another reason against considering (1) a material 
implication is this: (1) can only have truth-values if A and 
C have truth-values, and A and C can only have truth-values 
if (1) has truth-values. In the event that (1) is neither true 
nor false, A and C cannot be either true or false, since had 
they had truth-values, (1) would also have had truth-values. 
Which suggests that it is not possible that the acceptance of 
(1) together with TFH and (S) lead straight to a liar’s para-
dox: a liar’s paradox situation would emerge only if A and C
had truth-values, but that is not possible if (1) is a material 
implication. Since Haze failed to support the claim that (1) is 
a material implication, his claim that a liar’s paradox emerges 
is unfounded. 
Someone could object that my argument assumes that 
the material implication is, by definition, a two-valued func-
tion.3 However, it is plausible to think that the material im-
plication occurs in truth-functional logics with more than 
two truth-values, and hence isn’t, by definition, a two-valued 
function.4 This objection, however, misses the target. The ar-
gument works even under the assumption that the material 
implication isn’t a two-valued function. The only assumption 
my argument needs is that the truth-value of a compound 
truth-function results from the truth-values of its compo-
nents. Haze’s argument does not work because it oscillates 
between the thesis that the truth-value of a compound sen-
tence is a function of the truth-value of its sub-sentences5 
and the thesis that (1) has no truth-value. In order to make a 
compelling case against the material implication, you cannot 
have both. 
Haze would need to explain why the truth-function 
alone generates the liar’s paradox. The only way to do this is 
by attributing truth-values to A and C. But since intuitively A 
and C are neither true nor false, (1) won’t have truth-values 
either. The temptation is to go back and attribute truth-val-
ues to A and C based on this information, but that would be 
incoherent because the information depends on A and C not 
having truth-values in the first place. The paradox is stopped 
in its tracks.
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3 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to this point.
4 Consider, for example, Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic (L3) where ‘indeterminate’ is an additional truth-value. The only circumstances 
where the connective that represents the conditional is false is when the antecedent is true and the consequence is false. In the other 
circumstances in which the truth-values are only “true” and “false”, the conditional is true. The conditional is indeterminate in all remain-
ing circumstances involving the truth-value “indeterminate”. In other words, even in this three-valued logic, the connective preserves 
the truth-conditions of the material implication.
5 The argument need not assume that sentences are truth-bearers. One could, without any loss, substitute ‘proposition’ for ‘sentence’. 
